Allocation of Property Rights over Collective Networks
Keywords:
COLLECTIVE GOODS, NETWORKS, PROPERTY RIGHTS, TRANSACTION COSTS, R. COASEAbstract
This paper studies property rights allocation over collective goods, in particular, over networks. Based on Ronald Coase's theory, the author states that its insufficient production can be explained by the existence of transaction costs involved in property rights’ exchange. In this regard, he suggests to reduce those costs through some auction mechanism, in such a way that property rights could be allocated with greater efficiency.Downloads
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