The Southern African Development Community: challenges and problems

Por Anthony J. Leysens

In the year of South Africa’s first non-racial democratic election (1994), the country also became a member of the Southern African Development Community (SADC). During this time southern Africa has, deservedly, received a substantial amount of attention, most of it focusing on (traditional) regional security issues, the dynamics of regional economic integration/co-operation, and regional development.¹ The south-

ern African region can be analysed in terms of various dimensions. There is the pre-colonial history and geography of the region, the colonisation process by Britain and Portugal, the various national liberation struggles which led to independence, and lastly the role of South Africa as the dominant political-economic state in the region (Mandaza and Tostensen, 1994:2-3). The purpose of this paper is to give an overview of current developments within SADC and to point out some challenges and problems which the region faces. More specifically, the paper focuses on the last of the four explanatory dimensions, viz. the role of South Africa.

Although the paper is mainly descriptive, I use a specific explanatory framework and a conceptualisation of security which is more encompassing than the traditional understanding of this term. This, of course, influences my analysis, conclusion and recommendations. I start, therefore, by conceptualising security and sketching the outlines or assumptions of the (critical) theoretical approach which underlie the analysis. In the next section a brief historical background on the historical development of SADC is given, followed by an overview of current problems and challenges, and some conclusions and recommendations.

Theoretical Approach

The use of the concept security in international relations has traditionally been associated with the security of the state. This translates into a focus on the means (military/political/eco-
economic) to maintain the sovereignty of states in an international system which, because there is no overarching central authority, is perceived to be anarchical. Anarchy does not mean that there can be no co-operation between states, or that there are no rules or norms according to which states behave in their interaction with each other. It does mean, however, that the nature of the structure (absence of central authority in a system of sovereign states) determines that security for states means the implementation of policies (for instance, the formation of alliances) which ensure the continued sovereignty of the state. This (neorealist) approach to security which, for all intents and purposes, has dominated the analysis of international relations emphasises external threats to states.2 Booth (1994:21) calls this the “security dilemma.”

A more encompassing understanding of security emphasises the point that security is, in the final analysis, for humans, and that threats to individual security do not only come from outside states but also from within. Lastly, it emphasises that security has various dimensions and that it cannot be defined solely in terms of one dimension (for instance military security).3 What does this “broadened” or “new” conceptualisation of security mean for our understanding of regional security in southern Africa? Firstly, that we need to look at security issues in a multi-dimensional way. Booth (1994:29), following Buzan, suggests five dimensions: viz. military, political, economic, environmental, and societal. Secondly, that societal justice (for instance, material benefits for currently marginalised groups) should be considered (together

with order) as an important goal of security. Lastly, that in southern Africa security threats from outside (the traditional security dilemma) are less important than internal threats (for example, challenges by disaffected former supporters of an entrenched regime). What are the ramifications for regional security? Booth (1994:22) emphasises that:

“...the implications for ‘security policy’ are enormous. It means that priority has to be given to the domestic sources of instability rather than to the ideas and institutions which have dominated security policy elsewhere. Security policy must be more multi-level (dealing not just, or mainly, with states) and much more multifaceted (dealing not primarily with issues of military strategy but with the whole range of threats to a population’s well-being). According to this reasoning, traditional security regimes, designed to mitigate security dilemmas, will not be as relevant to the southern African future as some might think.”

I locate this broader conceptualisation of security within a critical explanatory framework which is based on the work of Robert Cox (1981, 1983, and 1987). The benefits of Cox’s Critical Theory (CCT) approach are located in its “reflexivity” (Neufeld, 1995) and the fact that it offers the analyst various points of entry within which to locate societal forces related to production (capital and labour). Reflexivity refers to the notion that we need to reflect upon the origins (context) of theory itself. Cox (1981:129-130) acknowledges the link between theory and interest when he states that: “theory is always for someone and for some purpose.” Moreover his framework incorporates the interaction and mutual effects between social forces, states

4. I am grateful to Larry Swatuk for suggesting this term to me.
and world orders in a non-deterministic manner. It thus transcends the traditional state-domestic division of neorealism and addresses the agent-structure problem which is not resolved, both within neorealism and world system theory (cf. Wallerstein, 1979 and Waltz, 1979).

The investigation of the relations between social forces, states and world orders must take place within the context of a specific historical structure. Within these structures three “forces” dynamically interact with each other. They are ideas (ideology), institutions (for instance, the IMF) and material capabilities (technology, wealth, industries and armaments) (Cox, 1981:136-137). How these forces are configured is not a matter of abstraction but is determined by a study of the particular historical epoch within which they are located. Secondly, it also requires a focus on tensions (contradictions) which can lead to the emergence of “rival structures.”

When there is a “fit” between the ideas, institutions, and material capabilities we find a world order (or regional order) which is characterised by hegemony (for instance, the Pax Americana). Cox’s conceptualisation of hegemony is taken from Gramsci. Thus, a hegemonic order (or hegemony) is characterised by consensus and not only coercion (the use of material power capabilities); it: “brings the interests of the leading class into harmony with those of subordinate classes and incorporates these other interests into an ideology expressed in universalist terms.” (Cox, 1983:168). Cox (1987) then goes on to apply Gramsci’s concept of hegemony to “international relations”, incorporating his three levels and the components of historical structures.

A hegemonic world order is not only an inter-state system. States can be seen as reflections of local configurations of social forces (local capital [manufacturing], global capital [manufacturing], established labour [skilled, corporate, unionised], and non-established labour [semi- or unskilled, temporary employ-
ment] who have links with transnational social forces (e.g. global corporate managers). In terms of these configurations forms of state (mercantilist, liberal, hyperliberal) and how they are incorporated within a particular world order can be identified (Cox, 1981:141, 148).

Historically, changes in hegemonic world orders have been brought about by a change in the configuration of social forces related to production in the core states (e.g. the cost of incorporating manufacturing workers in late nineteenth century Britain, through the provision of welfare benefits, led to increased calls for protectionism and the decline of the free trade regime) (Cox, 1981:141-142).

Lastly, the hegemonic order which has historically expanded from the core states (after having undergone “a thorough social and economic revolution”) is “laden with contradictions at the periphery.” This can be seen in the responses of local configurations of social forces (labour, capital and bureaucracy) in the periphery to the globalisation of production, and the “internationalisation of the state.” (Cox, 1983:171 and Cox, 1981:146, 151). Thus, the “building blocks” of Cox’s approach are: social forces related to modes of production, states (and the particular form of those states, and the nature of the current world order - it is within these building blocks that we need to locate the region.

SADC: Historical Background, Process and Institutions

The origin of the SADC lies in its predecessor, the Southern African Development and Co-ordination Conference (SADCC), which was formed in 1980 with the objective, inter alia, to lessen the region’s economic dependence on apartheid South Africa, but also on the industrialised states of the North. The original members were Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi,
Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Namibia joined after independence in 1990, followed by South Africa in 1994. The most recent members to join are Mauritius (1995), and Seychelles and the Democratic Republic of Congo (1997). Up and until 1992, SADCC’s institutions were based on a Memorandum of Understanding (1981) between the member states and it was therefore not a treaty bound organisation.

The SADCC initiative originated from within the former Frontline States (FLS) group. The latter was a political association, formed in the early 1970s to co-ordinate policies, particularly those pertaining to the liberation struggles against the white minority regimes in the region. Tanzania and Zambia were the original members, later joined by Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Namibia and Zimbabwe. The latter’s independence (as a more industrialised state) was seen as an opportunity to attract more foreign donor aid to the region. Hence the idea to organise a Southern African Aid Co-ordination Conference.

During the preparation for this conference at a meeting of the FLS in 1979, Mozambique suggested that a “mechanism” should be put in place for more formal co-operation around regional development issues after the conference, and particularly, for the creation of a transport network which would reduce dependence on South Africa. These factors, and the perceived need to draw newly independent Zimbabwe into the

5. Apart from the region’s transport dependence on South Africa, particularly the landlocked states (Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe), states in the region are to various degrees reliant on South African imports, investment, and employment opportunities (mainly in the form of migrant labour). In addition, trade with the Northern industrialised countries is traditionally skewed in terms of a dependence on agricultural and primary products exports to earn foreign exchange (Mandaza and Tostensen, 1994:23-26).
fold, led to a declaration (Southern Africa: Towards Economic Liberation) by the leaders of the FLS (also signed by representatives of Lesotho, Malawi, Swaziland and Zimbabwe) on 1 April 1980, and the formation of SADCC (Mandaza and Tostensen, 1994:4-13).

The initial approach which was chosen to enhance economic co-operation between the member states was one of project co-operation and development co-ordination rather than market integration. Projects are based in the individual member-states and are largely dependent on foreign funding. The guidelines for the process which was to be followed to attain the regional objectives\(^6\) of reducing economic dependence, establishing links between member states to move towards regional integration, the co-ordination of national and regional policies, and to promote international involvement in the economic liberation of the region are contained within the Programme of Action (1980).

The process which was initiated to increase co-operation and move towards integration can be described as functional. Member states submit projects which are nationally based (within specific sectors) but which must also contribute towards regional objectives. To this effect, member states were also allocated sectors to co-ordinate in which they were perceived to have a particular national interest, thus giving a state more of an incentive to effectively co-ordinate policies, strategies and priorities in the area for which it was given (regional responsibility). The responsibility for funding and implementing a project (ownership) is at the state level. At the regional level, SADCC/SADC, is responsible for ensuring that the

\(^6\) From the Lusaka Declaration (1 April 1980), Southern Africa Toward Economic Liberation, Development Objectives (Mandaza and Tostensen, 1994:116).
projects conform to regional objectives and criteria, and for securing co-operation from international partners through the Annual Consultative Conferences (ACC) (Mandaza and Tostensen, 1994:31-34).

A number of sectors and subsectors were agreed upon and allocated to the respective member states through the *Programme of Action*: for instance, Culture and Information (Mozambique), Energy (Angola), Food, Agricultural and Natural Resources (Zimbabwe), Human Resources Development (Swaziland), Industry and Trade (Tanzania), Mining (Zambia), Tourism (Lesotho), Transport and Communications (Mozambique), Livestock Production and Animal Disease Control (Botswana), Marine Fisheries and Resources (Namibia). South Africa (after joining in 1994) was allocated the Finance and Investment Sector. Member states fulfil their regional sectoral responsibilities through nationally based Sector Co-ordinating Units (SCU’s) (Mandaza and Tostensen, 1994:73; DFA, 1996:12).

Because the initial project approach resulted in projects which were more in the national interest of member states than

7. Sectoral policies must be supportive of regional objectives, they should contribute to the regional production of goods and services, should involve the private sector, must be co-ordinated and linked to other sectors, and be evaluated to determine progress. In 1987, criteria were adopted in the *Programme of Action* which were aimed at ensuring that projects promoted regional goals, were regionally prioritised and were “technically and economically feasible” (Mandaza and Tostensen, 1994:35-38).

8. The ACCs provide a forum were the member states and the “international co-operating partners” meet to evaluate performance and to chart out the course ahead based “on the principal of mutual benefit” (Mandaza and Tostensen, 1994:83). Traditionally, these partners have been the European Union, the Nordic countries, the Commonwealth, and the United Nations.

9. Malan (1998) points out the inefficiency of the project approach which led to the appointment of consultants (from Malawi, South Africa and Zimbabwe) to undertake a *Review and Rationalisation of the SADC Programme of Action*. The report by the consultants revealed that: “only 22 per cent by num-
in the interest of the region, by 1987 steps were being taken to ensure more efficient co-ordination between the sectoral policies of the member states (see footnote 7). Particularly, co-ordination which would lead to the enhancement of regional trade. The changes which were set in motion in South Africa in 1990, as well as the changing global political economy which stresses trade competitiveness, led to a shift in emphasis in SADCC’s focus, from development co-operation to trade (and development) integration. This was the motive of the 1992 theme document SADCC: Toward Economic Integration, and given effect by The Declaration and Treaty of the Southern African Development Community, signed on 17 August 1992.

The principles underlying the treaty are: co-ordination of member state policies to attain “sustainable development”, sovereign equality of member states, solidarity, peace and security, human rights, democracy and rule of law, equity, balance and mutual benefit. Article 5 of the treaty sets out the objectives:

- Achieve development and economic growth, alleviate poverty, enhance the standard and quality of life of the peoples of Southern Africa and support the socially disadvantaged through regional integration;
- Evolve common political values, systems and institutions;
- Promote and defend peace and security;
- Promote self-sustaining development on the basis of collective self-reliance, and the inter-dependence of member States;

Furthermore according to Malan (1998:39): “Only about twelve to fourteen per cent of the total cost of the project portfolio is sourced within SADC, while donor funding amounts to approximately seventy per cent of the total funding secured for the current SPA.”
• Achieve complementarity between national and regional strategies and programmes;
• Promote and maximise productive employment and utilisation of resources of the region;
• Achieve sustainable utilisation of natural resources and effective protection of the environment; and
• Strengthen and consolidate the long-standing historical, social and cultural affinities and links among the peoples of the region (DFA, 1996:2-3).

To achieve these objectives the treaty, Article 22 (1), makes provision for the conclusion of number of protocols to “spell out the objectives and scope of, and institutional mechanisms for co-operation and integration.” Protocols are approved by the Summit and recommended by the Council (of Ministers) and must be ratified by the representatives (parliaments) of all the member states before they take effect. The following areas of co-operation are identified in Article 21(3):

• food security, land and agriculture;
• infrastructure and services;
• industry, trade, investment and finance;
• human resources, development, science and technology;
• natural resources and environment;
• social welfare, information and culture; and
• politics, diplomacy, international relations, peace and security (SADC, 1992).

To date a number of protocols have been recommended and accepted by the Summit of SADC: Transport, Communications and Meteorology; Shared Watercourse System Protocol; Energy, Trade, Illicit Drug Trafficking, Education and Training, and the Protocol on the Facilitation of Movement of Persons in SADC. The June 1996 Summit meeting in Gaborone (Botswana) also
recommended the institutionalisation of a separate SADC Org-
organ on Politics, Defence and Security. The current institutions
of SADC, as encompassed by the SADC Treaty of 1992, are
shown in Figure 1. They include those institutions stipulated
in the Treaty, as well as commissions, other institutions, and
organs which the Summit can create “as the need arises” (Ar-
ticle 10, para 6).

The Heads of State or Government (the Summit) is “the
supreme policy-making Institution of SADC.” The chair and
vice-chair are elected from the member-states for an agreed pe-
riod of time (three years). Decisions are made by consensus and
are binding.

The Council of Ministers consists of one minister from each
member state (usually the minister responsible for economics
or finance) and meets once a year. The chair and vice-chair of
the Council are appointed by the chair and vice-chair of SADC,
respectively. The Council is inter alia responsible for defining
and allocating sectorial areas of co-operation, approving poli-
cies, strategies and work programmes of SADC, and overseeing
the implementation of SADC policies and its programmes. It also
convenes the Annual Consultative Conferences with the inter-
national co-operating partners.

The Secretariat is the chief executive institution of SADC.
It implements decisions made by the Summit and the Council
and is responsible for the strategic planning and management
of SADC programmes, financial and general administration. The
Secretariat is headed by the Executive Secretary, who undertakes
consultation and co-ordination with member states governments
and other institutions, promotes co-operation with other
organisations, and is responsible for diplomatic and other rep-
resentations of SADC.

The Standing Committee of Officials consists of one per-
manent public official from each member state (ideally from
finance or economic planning). It meets at least once a year,
and is responsible to the Council, to which it gives technical advice.

National Contact Points are located within ministries (usually Foreign Affairs) of member states and are responsible for the co-ordination between SADC and the member state, including the sector for which the member state is responsible. Sector Contact Points are located in the ministries responsible for specific sectors.

Sectorial Committees of Ministers and Sectorial Committees of Officials are regional committees consisting of the ministers and public officials of the various member states pertaining to a particular sector, for instance agriculture.

Sector Co-ordinating Units (SCU) are based in the member state responsible for the particular sector or subsector. The SCU is usually located in the ministry which is concerned with that sector. For example, South Africa, which is responsible for finance and investment has a Finance and Investment Sector Co-ordinating Unit (FISCU) which is located in the Department of Finance (DFA, 1996:12)).

To date, there are two Sector Commissions, viz. the Southern African Transport and Communication Commission (SATCC) and the Southern African Centre for Co-operation in Agricultural Research (SACCAR). Commissions are approved by the Summit and are formed to facilitate and integrate policies and programmes in assigned sectors (in this case, Transport and Communications and Agricultural Research and Training).

The Tribunal is constituted by the Summit which adopts a protocol circumscribing its powers and functions. It is meant to adjudicate on disputes which arise from the interpretation of the provisions of the SADC treaty.

The SADC Organ on Politics Defence and Security (OPDS) was instituted at a meeting of the Summit on 28 June 1996 in Gaborone, Botswana to replace the defunct FLS. According to
the *communiqué* issued at the time it functions at the Summit level, independently of other SADC structures.

Currently, the **Inter-State Defence and Security Committee** (ISDSC) is the main operational arm of the Organ. The committee consists of a ministerial council and officials from the traditional security establishments of member states (defence, security and intelligence and is chaired on a rotational basis by the ministers of defence of member states (Cilliers, 1997:2).

The organ’s principles allow for a broad conceptualisation of security which includes *inter alia* peaceful settlement of disputes, military intervention only when all other means have been exhausted, the attainment of regional peace, solidarity and security, and the promotion of regional economic development which takes into consideration equity, balance and mutual benefit. One of the objectives states that the Organ aims to “promote the political, economic, social and environmental dimensions of security.” (http://www.sadc-usa.net/reference/protocol/organ.html, 2 April 1998).

**Challenges and Problems**

The major challenges and problems which SADC faces are related to South Africa’s role in the region, the ambitious goals which the organisation has set itself, and the need to bring material benefits to the (regional) urban unemployed and the (regional) rural communities which find themselves on the fringes of the formal economy. In this section I start off by highlighting some challenges and then focus on South Africa’s material capabilities (production and trade) *vis-à-vis* the rest of the region. As will be shown below, South Africa’s overwhelming regional economic dominance (being one aspect of its regional hegemony), poses a problem of major proportions for the goal of integration based on “equity, balance and mutual benefit.” My
Figure 1: SADC Organigram

SADC Heads of State or Government Summit

The Tribunal

Organ on Politics Defence and Security

Interstate Defence and Security Committee

Council of Ministers

SADC Secretariat

Standing Committee of Officials

National Contact Points

Sectorial Committees of Ministers

Sectorial Committees of Officials

Sector Coordinating Units/Commissions

Sector Contact Points

(Source: Derived from Van Aardt, 1997:29-30)
analysis below is informed by the theoretical premises set out in the first section of the paper.

One of the first challenges for SADC is the building (not just creating) of regional institutions to which the member states are prepared to relinquish some sovereignty. Currently, the organisation is a mixture of decentralisation (the legacy of the project based approach favoured by SADCC) and the more centralised or regional approach to development and trade integration which underlies the principles and objectives of the SADC. The latter is evident in the number of ambitious (draft) protocols which have been accepted by the Summit to speed up regional integration\(^\text{10}\). It is also evident in the political-economic objectives and principles set out in the SADC treaty (see above).

As will be recalled (footnote 9), the vast majority of “regional” projects (nearly 500, costing $US 8 500) do not meet regional criteria. This fact, and the complex system of SCU’s, working groups and technical committees led to the appointment of the consultant team to review the SPA. Its recommendations envisage a total revamp and streamlining of the current institutions to reflect more of a private sector input, the creation of national SADC committees and regional directorates who focus on the promotion of and co-ordination of integration policies in only five fields. It also recommends the rationalisation of the SADC Secretariat. The reception so far, seems to have been less than enthusiastic (Malan, 1998:6-8, 39). This could be attributed to the reaction of entrenched interests build up over many years, but it

\(^{10}\) For instance the Draft Protocol on the Free Movement of Persons in the SADC Region (1995) which was, after a lukewarm reception by South Africa, changed to the Draft Protocol on the Facilitation of Movement of Persons in the SADC (1997). Then there is also the Draft Protocol on Trade in the SADC Region (1996), which aims to establish a Free Trade Area (FTA) within eight years of ratification by 75% of the member states. So far, only three member states have ratified the Protocol.
is also an indication of an unwillingness among the governments of member-states (notwithstanding the provisions of Article 23\textsuperscript{11}) to “open up” SADC to the input from NGO’s and civil society, and to take steps which can address the current imbalance between the interests of the member-states and regional interests.

A further example illustrates the “sovereignty” or “decentralisation” challenge which SADC will have to address. Currently, as embodied within the principles and objectives of SADC and the SADC OPDS the organisation has political and economic objectives and has chosen to adopt a broad conceptualisation of security which acknowledges the various dimensions and the fact that threats can also originate from within member states\textsuperscript{12}.

The example relates to a non-traditional security issue which has originated from within Zambia. The issue revolves around the way in which the former president of Zambia (Kenneth Kaunda) was prohibited from participating in recent elections on the grounds that he was not a Zambian citizen. Criticism by the Zambian press was followed by the harassment and arrest of journalists. After a botched attempted coup attempt by a jun-

\textsuperscript{11} Article 23 (1) states that: “In Pursuance of the objectives of this Treaty, SADC shall seek to involve fully, the peoples of the Region and nongovernmental organisations in the process of regional integration.”

\textsuperscript{12} It will be recalled that among the principles underlying the treaty and in accordance with which member states must act is “human rights, democracy, and the rule of law. Furthermore the objectives of OPDS (the SADC institution created to deal with security) include; safeguarding regional development against the (internal) breakdown of law and order, (external) inter-state conflict, and external aggression; developing a common foreign policy and promoting common political values; mediate in inter-state and intra-state disputes; promote the development of democratic institutions; promote peace-making and peace-keeping; develop a collective security capacity and promote peace-keeping and peace-keeping; and to promote the political, economic, social and environmental dimensions of security. As can be seen these objectives include traditional (political) and non-traditional security (development, economic, social, environmental) issues.
ior military officer (October 1997), Kaunda was accused of involvement and arrested. He was later released.

These events which could be addressed in terms of the principles and objectives of both SADC and the OPDS have received scant attention from the organisation. In fact, critical comments by the current chair of SADC (President Nelson Mandela) were not (publicly) endorsed by the member states. This unwillingness to act in terms of the principles and objectives of the organisation has been criticised at the first meeting of the Southern African Human Rights Non-Governmental Organisation Network (SAHRINGON) on 23 February 1997, and also by the Zambian press. In an editorial *The Post of Zambia* (3 March 1998) lambastes SADC for its inactivity and warns that “For SADC to regain and retain its credibility and be seen as a useful organisation it will need to address issues like this one straight on.”

Although one needs to acknowledge that SADC is not a fully evolved supranational regional organisation, the fact is that it has (ambitiously) adopted the principles and objectives of one, and because of this its policies will be evaluated accordingly.

A second challenge relates to how the organisation will resolve the perceived “clash” (cf. Malan, 1998) between the political and economic (development) goals of SADC within one security institution (OPDS). In addition there is currently a heated debate going on as to the legal status of the Organ, which is supposed to function at the Summit level as well as independently of other SADC structures. South Africa, the current chair, maintains that in terms of Article 10 of the SADC Treaty13 there can be no separate Summit with a separate chairperson. On the other hand, Zimbabwe, which holds the chair of the OPDS,

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13. Specifically, that “the Summit...shall be the supreme policy-making Institution of SADC; that it will “be responsible for the overall policy direction and control of the functions of SADC; and that it “shall decide on the creation of commissions, other institutions, committees and organs as the need arises.”
maintains that in terms of the example of the former FLS it is possible for the Organ to operate as a separate Summit on a “flexible and informal” basis (Malan, 1998:15-16).

With respect to the possibility for the OPDS to embrace a broad approach to security a leading and influential South African based security think tank (the Institute for Security Studies) earlier supported such an approach and advocated the involvement of non-state actors (“NGO’s, academics and other informed representatives of civil society”) through the establishment of an Institute for Democracy and Human Rights. It’s task would be to provide information and support to the SADC security structure (Malan and Cilliers, 1997). However, in a recent monograph Malan (1998), citing as reasons the disagreement on the status of the OPDS and instability in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Angola, Kenya, the Central African Republic and Zambia, argues for a “divorce” between “economic” issues and security concerns (p.32) or “security” from “economic development and integration” (p.37). Instead a separate treaty is suggested “...establishing something like a ‘Southern African Union’ which would act as the principal forum for security discussions” (p. 36).

At this stage one can only wonder at what brought about such an extreme volte face. In the meantime a decision has been made by the SADC Heads of State or Government (Maputo, 3 March 1998) to again look at the legality as well as the nature of OPDS. The point which they will need to bear in mind is that security and economic development in the region are directly linked. Most security issues (migration, arms smuggling, drug trafficking, organised crime, and poverty) in the region originate from within, and while they may lead to spill-over into neighbouring states, they are linked to development and the meeting of material needs.

In terms of a Coxian approach this requires us to take a “bottom up” and “top down” look at the production relations within the region and within the individual member states of SADC.
The region consists of social forces related to production (capital and labour) (bottom), states, and is incorporated within a world order (top). The focus on social forces related to production does not undermine the notion of a broader conceptualisation of security, because most of the non-traditional security issues (for example, migration) are the result (in terms of being excluded or marginalised) of the power configurations between labour, capital and the state, and how they are incorporated within the contemporary world order.

The challenges which have been identified above will have to be addressed within the context of South Africa's regional political-economic hegemony. In the last part of this paper I illustrate South Africa's regional trade dominance and the importance of the regional market as an outlet for its manufactured products. In this respect I disagree with Lieberman (1997:95) when he says that “...non-African capital and markets (own emphasis) are of greater significance” for South Africa. I do agree with him, however, when he argues that South Africa uses the SADC as a “cloak” to promote its own interests. This regional hegemony can be explained in Gramscian terms.

Table 1 lists a number of economic indicators for the SADC member states (with the exception of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Seychelles). South Africa's GDP is an enormous 77% of the region's GDP, and 44% of Sub-Saharan Africa's GDP. It also accounted for 68% of the region's exports in 1994. In terms of population it accounts for approximately one third of the region's total and its economy is nearly 3.5 larger than the rest of the listed SADC states combined. Important to take note of as well is the proportion of total imports South Africa makes out for Botswana (85%), Lesotho (88%), Malawi (47%), Namibia (90%) and Swaziland (94%). Except for Malawi, all these states are members (with South Africa) of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) and SADC (Ahwireng-Obeng and McGowan, 1998:20-21).
Table 1: SADC Countries: Economic Indicators**

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<td>2</td>
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<td>Portugal (53%)</td>
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<td>Botswana+</td>
<td>581 730</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td>South Africa (85%)</td>
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<td>Lesotho+</td>
<td>30 355</td>
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<td>0.9</td>
<td>17</td>
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<td>South Africa (88%)</td>
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<td>Malawi</td>
<td>118 484</td>
<td>9.8</td>
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<td>South Africa (47%)</td>
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<td>824 258</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1 321</td>
<td>South Africa (90%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa+</td>
<td>1 223 201</td>
<td>45.1</td>
<td>121.9</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>25 000</td>
<td>Germany (16%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swaziland+</td>
<td>17 364</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>343</td>
<td>South Africa (94%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>945 087</td>
<td>28.7</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>519</td>
<td>Saudi Arabia (11%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>752 618</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>1 075</td>
<td>South Africa (22%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>390 759</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>1 775</td>
<td>South Africa (24%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SADC Total</td>
<td>6 934 196</td>
<td>139.4</td>
<td>158.2</td>
<td>19.8*</td>
<td>36 692</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

South Africa as percent of SADC 17.6% 32.4% 77.0% NA 68.1% NA
South Africa as percent of SSA 7% 5% 44.0% NA 42.3% NA


** At the time of the compilation of this table the Democratic Republic of Congo and Seychelles had not yet been accepted as members of SADC.

* = SADC Average; . . = Not Available; NA = Not Applicable; + = SACU Member.
Table 2 shows the importance of the region (first SACU and then SADC) as an outlet for South African exports and shows that out of South Africa’s top ten exports markets, five are located in Southern Africa. This is an important point to take note of, as its is commonly believed that South Africa’s major trading partners are still all located among the industrialised states of the North. Moreover, South Africa’s trade balance with the states in the region is highly favourable (including Mozambique and Zambia which rank nr. 17 and 20 respectively, R19.5 billion), whereas its trade balance with Northern states is negative (R23,2 billion) (Ahwireng-Obeng and McGowan, 1998:68).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Exports (R ’000)</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Imports (R ’000)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>8 642,4</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>16 656,2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>6 544,1</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>11 860,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>5 720,2</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>10 943,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>5 333,4</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>9 922,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Namibia*#</td>
<td>5 125,4</td>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>4 377,2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Botswana*#</td>
<td>4 822,4</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>4 045,8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Zimbabwe#</td>
<td>4 240,8</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>3 804,2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>3 825,9</td>
<td>Taiwan+</td>
<td>3 252,9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Swaziland*#</td>
<td>3 366,0</td>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>2 398,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Lesotho*#</td>
<td>3 219,3</td>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>2 315,2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Permission to use table granted. Compiled from various sources by Ahwireng-Obeng and McGowan (1998).

* Member of Southern African Customs Union (SACU), data are for 1994.
# Member of the Southern African Development Community (SADC).
+ Classified by the US Department of Commerce as a ‘Big Emerging Market’.
Table 3 shows a detailed breakdown of South Africa’s trade balances with SACU, SADC and the rest of Africa. SADC member states bought 89.5% of South Africa’s exports to Africa in 1995 and accounted for 92% of South Africa’s trade surplus with the rest of Africa. As can be seen, however, it is the members of SACU which make up the majority proportion (63%) of South Africa’s regional exports. It is of particular importance to note the growth (31% in 1996, 48% in 1995, and 27% in 1994) and nature (semi-manufactured and manufactured goods) of South Africa’s exports to the region. Africa and specifically Southern Africa takes nearly 30% of South Africa’s manufactured products and makes it the market where it is most competitive (Ahwireng-Obeng and McGowan, 1998:11-12).

In terms of Cox’s framework one would expect to find a link/incorporation between the dominant social forces (manufacturing capital with global links and their established labour force) in member-states of the SADC and the global order. Furthermore, one would also expect to find that the hegemonic order in the region reflects the ideas/ideology (free trade and market competitiveness) of the global order. For instance, through its connection with global institutions such as the IMF (for those member-states who have implemented structural adjustment programmes, e.g. Zimbabwe, Mozambique and Zambia).

Hegemony (in the Gramscian sense), it will be recalled, does not depend on coercion but on consensus. The question of whether South Africa is a “partner or hegemon” can therefore be turned around. In order to maintain a hypothetical regional hegemonic order, South Africa would have to be a partner and/or acquire partners in the region. Partners are acquired by mak-

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country/Grouping</th>
<th>1994 Exports (R '000)</th>
<th>1995 Exports (R '000)</th>
<th>1994 Imports (R '000)</th>
<th>1995 Imports (R '000)</th>
<th>Balance (R '000)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>4 686 951</td>
<td>4 822 388</td>
<td>264 089</td>
<td>402 421</td>
<td>4 419 967</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>3 473 269</td>
<td>3 219 229</td>
<td>102 175</td>
<td>139 330</td>
<td>3 079 899</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>4 618 690</td>
<td>5 125 400</td>
<td>1 364 160</td>
<td>1 525 100</td>
<td>3 600 300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swaziland</td>
<td>2 627 415</td>
<td>3 365 977</td>
<td>987 400</td>
<td>1 159 746</td>
<td>2 206 231</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1) SACU Total</td>
<td>15 406 325</td>
<td>16 532 994</td>
<td>2 717 824</td>
<td>3 226 597</td>
<td>13 306 397</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>311 835</td>
<td>409 750</td>
<td>16 891</td>
<td>3 593</td>
<td>406 157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>622 044</td>
<td>663 979</td>
<td>185 221</td>
<td>206 651</td>
<td>457 328</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritius</td>
<td>541 318</td>
<td>670 150</td>
<td>15 145</td>
<td>38 019</td>
<td>632 131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>1 406 776</td>
<td>1 839 232</td>
<td>91 931</td>
<td>122 800</td>
<td>1 717 123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>183 233</td>
<td>566 667</td>
<td>15 856</td>
<td>16 623</td>
<td>550 044</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>1158 676</td>
<td>1 301 610</td>
<td>103 890</td>
<td>95 428</td>
<td>1 206 182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>2 459 400</td>
<td>4 240 838</td>
<td>1 021 599</td>
<td>992 539</td>
<td>3 248 299</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Non-SACU SADC Total</td>
<td>6 683 282</td>
<td>9 692 917</td>
<td>1 450 533</td>
<td>1 475 653</td>
<td>8 217 264</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3=1+2) SADC Total</td>
<td>22 089 607</td>
<td>26 225 911</td>
<td>4 168 357</td>
<td>4 702 250</td>
<td>21 523 661</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) Rest of Africa</td>
<td>1 948 675</td>
<td>3 078 944</td>
<td>903 495</td>
<td>1 217 821</td>
<td>1 861 123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5=3+4) Total Africa</td>
<td>24 038 282</td>
<td>29 304 855</td>
<td>5 071 832</td>
<td>5 920 071</td>
<td>23 384 784</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Permission to use table granted. Compiled from various sources by Ahwireng-Obeng and McGowan (1998).

* For Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland the data are for 1993 and 1994.
ing concessions (giving rewards) and building institutions which espouse ideas and values (a universalist language) which is acceptable to and incorporates subordinate social forces/states. To illustrate how this might work in the region we need to return to the concept historical structure, the notion of ideas, material capabilities and institutions, and the “fit” which is required between them to ensure a hegemonic order.

One aspect of South Africa’s material capabilities (in terms of production and trade) vis-à-vis the region are well documented. In fact, the region (first, the SACU members, then the rest of the SADC) has become the main export market for South Africa’s manufactured products (Ahwireng-Obeng and McGowan, 1997; Davies, 1997:117-118). When it comes to ideas, the universalist language (values and ideas) in which South Africa’s regional agenda is couched (“equity”, “mutually beneficial”, “non-hegemonic” and “for the good of the region”) are crucial to establish a climate of consensus. These ideas, specifically the notion of mutually beneficial trade and co-operation which takes cognisance of developmental needs are also reflected in and supported by SADC as an institution. My contention would be, however, that this “universalist” language hides a very real hegemonic order of the Gramscian type. Moreover, it is a regional order which replicates the ideas/ideology of the current global hegemonic order.

South Africa can (as the political-economic hegemon) afford to open its market to regional trade (with reservations expressed by traditionally protected sectors of the economy such as textiles).\(^\text{15}\) Like Britain in the nineteenth century and the USA (between 1945-1975), a regional economically dominant state is in favour of liberalisation vis-à-vis those states which

\(^{15}\) In fact, South Africa as a “goodwill gesture”, has recently suggested the scrapping of tariffs on 60% of industrial and agricultural products from the SADC region with effect from 1 January 1999.
are receptacles for exports, but do not have the productive capacity to compete in the market of the hegemon. Furthermore, a number of states in the region have already opened their markets to extra-regional trade (the result of IMF SAP’s). Lastly, regional free trade is in the interests of (specifically) those sections of South African capital and labour who are globally integrated and connected. The universalist language (regional equity and development) which is used in SADC documents is there to compensate (reward) the subordinate/marginalised social forces: non-established labour (non-commercial agriculture and the urban unemployed) and some sectors of local manufacturing capital (specifically in the peripheral SADC states).

It is my contention that the major problem for future regional relations lies in the exclusion of these marginalised (subordinate) social forces. They are not part of the dominant social forces which make up the present society-state-regional complex and are therefore a potential area of tension and transformation within the current historical structure.

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