The nested game of the Argentinian constitutional reform

Authors

  • Mara Pegoraro Universidad de Buenos Aires
  • Florencia Zulcovsky Universidad de Buenos Aires

Keywords:

Constitutional reform, Olivos Pact, Menem, Alfonsín, Nested games, Tsebelis, Argentina

Abstract

The article tries to explain the dynamics of the negotiation process that ended in the constitutional reform of 1994 in Argentina. The authors focus specially on the period that led to the Olivos Pact and the sanction of the law that call in 1993 a Constituent assembly for the following year. Why did the Unión Cívica Radical and the Partido Justicialista reach an agreement during this process, which could be seen as a sub-optimum outcome; and not looking for their a priori dominant strategy: resisting the reform or promoting it at all costs, respectively? Seen as a “nested game”, the process does not look like a sub-optimum outcome, on the contrary it was a game played simultaneously on three arenas. From this perspective, the article discusses the wellknown thesis that points the reform process as a typical “chicken game”.

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Author Biographies

Mara Pegoraro, Universidad de Buenos Aires

Magíster en Administración y Políticas Públicas (Universidad
de San Andrés) y licenciada en Ciencia Política (Universidad
de Buenos Aires).

Florencia Zulcovsky, Universidad de Buenos Aires

Candidata a magíster en Administración y Políticas Públicas (Universidad de San Andrés) y licenciada en Ciencia Política (Universidad de Buenos Aires).

Published

2017-11-24

How to Cite

Pegoraro, M., & Zulcovsky, F. (2017). The nested game of the Argentinian constitutional reform. Colección, (21), 93–114. Retrieved from https://erevistas.uca.edu.ar/index.php/COLEC/article/view/853

Issue

Section

Research Articles