Is a "Soft" Monetary Authority Appropriate?
Palabras clave:
Objetivos de Inflación, Autoridad Monetaria, Modelos de Equilibro General Estocástico Dinámico, Regla de Taylor, CredibilidadResumen
Teniendo como marco de referencia la “estrategia de inflación objetivo” es usual discutir lo que es más conveniente para una sociedad en cuanto al grado de “dureza” o “agresividad” de una autoridad monetaria para defender su meta de inflación, y la credibilidad de que esta goza entre los agentes económicos. En este documento utilizamos un modelo de equilibrio general dinámico estocástico (DSGE, por sus siglas en inglés) neo-keynesiano tanto con expectativas racionales como adaptativas para analizar esta cuestión y, además, cuantificamos los efectos de estos dos tipos de autoridades sobre el bienestar social utilizando una función de utilidad convencional. Nuestros resultados sugieren que el problema que se puede derivar de una autoridad “blanda” es arriesgar la pérdida de credibilidad en su (supuesto) empeño para alcanzar una determinada meta de inflación. Además, presentamos y utilizamos una solución del modelo lo suficientemente simple como para permitir que sus simulaciones sean implementadas en una hoja de cálculo.Descargas
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