Taxation without representation: Argentina since 1983

Abstract

Argentina is neither representative nor federal because of two constitutional anomalies: the representation of the people is violated because the provinces with a majority of inhabitants (Buenos Aires, Cordoba, Mendoza and Santa Fe) have a minority of representatives in the lower chamber; tax-sharing is not based on objective, equitable and solidary criteria, so Buenos Aires Province is treaded on (it received a third of the resources per inhabitant of other provinces in 2016). Both are legacies of de facto governments, preserved by an unrepresentative Congress. Two reforms are proposed: (i) representation proportional to population in the lower chamber, to end with a Congress where a minority decides how much to tax and how to spend it; (ii) a tax-sharing regime based on the distribution of the same resources per inhabitant to all districts: since they would all receive the same amount if they contributed the same, it is equitable; since richer districts contribute more, it is solidary. The reforms are impracticable unless Buenos Aires Province unflinchingly demands them through all legitimate means.