Interaction between a strategic mass media firm and a government

Authors

  • Julián Alberto Batista Universidad de San Andrés

Keywords:

Media and Elections, Government, Voters, Nash equilibrium

Abstract

This paper deals with the dynamics between the mass media and the governments of the Latin American states. Although over the past decade the latter have waged “some war” against the former, the paper assures that it is not due to the reasons they claim, but instead it is about economic matters. Therefore a model has been drawn, using the “principal” vs “incumbent” methodology, where a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium will be reached. Apart from the model, the author goes over related literature, and also will conclude by pointing out the strengths and weaknesses of the proposed model.

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Published

11/04/2019

How to Cite

Batista, J. A. (2019). Interaction between a strategic mass media firm and a government. Ensayos De Política Económica, 2(2), 8–25. Retrieved from https://erevistas.uca.edu.ar/index.php/ENSAYOS/article/view/2368