Three lessons about institutions and incentives

Authors

  • Federico G. M. Sosa Valle Fundación Instituto David Hume

Keywords:

institutions, incentives, institutional change, economic performance, economic growth, neoinstitutionalism

Abstract

In this article, aimed at the “informed public”, the relationships drawn between institutions and incentives are analyzed in three seemingly disparate works: Institutions, institutional change and economic performance, by Douglas C. North (1990); The Elusive Quest for Growth: Economist's Adventures and Misadventures in the Tropics, by William Easterly (2001) and, finally, Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty, by Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson (2012). Based on the assumption that human beings are maximizing agents of utility, it is studied how these authors interpret the dynamics of the institutional frameworks as incentive systems for the election of said agents, without yielding to “culturalist” or sociological temptations. This study not only includes the impact of institutions on the logic of economic choice, but also the feedback of the latter regarding the structures of institutional change.

Downloads

Download data is not yet available.

References

Acemoglu, D. & Robinson, J. A. (2012). Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty. New York: Crown Publishers.

Buchanan, J. M. (1989). Ensayos sobre Economía Política. México: Alianza Editorial Mexicana.

Easterly, W. (2001). The Elusive Quest of Growth. Economist's Adventures and Misadventures in the Tropics. Massachusetts: The MIT Press.

Hayek, F. A. (1948). Individualism and Economic Order. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Hayek, F. A. (1960). The Constitution of Liberty. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Hayek, F. A. (1973). Law, Legislation and Liberty (Vol. 1). Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Hayek, F. A. (1976). Law, Legislation and Liberty (Vol. 2). Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Hayek, F. A. (1979). Law, Legislation and Liberty (Vol. 3). Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

De Imaz, J. L. (1964). Los que mandan. Buenos Aires: EUDEBA.

Lachmann, L. (1977), Capital and its Structure (Studies in Economic Theory). New York: New York University Press.

North, D. C. (1990). Instituciones, cambio institucional y desempeño económico. México: Fondo de Cultura Económica (Traducción al español, 1993).

Schmitt, C. (1996). The Concept of the Political. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press (Traducción en la edición de 1932 de Des Begriff des Politichen).

Weber, M. (1942). Historia Económica General. México: Fondo de Cultura Económica.

Published

2019-12-27

How to Cite

Sosa Valle, F. G. M. (2019). Three lessons about institutions and incentives. Cultura Económica, 37(98), 31–44. Retrieved from https://erevistas.uca.edu.ar/index.php/CECON/article/view/2729