Resolving deep disagreements rationally: towards a notion of concrete rationality
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.46553/cecon.42.107.2024.p49-65Keywords:
deep disagreements, rationality, criterion problem, rationally unsolvable disagreementAbstract
A current debate within epistemology, particularly in its Anglo-Saxon version, is about deep disagreements. Although the notion is not entirely univocal, deep disagreements are generally understood as disagreements about the propositions that frame our rationality. A recurrent question is whether such disagreements are rationally resolvable. This article will give a general presentation of the state of the question in order to propose that this second problem is ill-founded, since it is approached from a notion of abstract rationality that is not in line with our habitual use of reason.
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